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VISUAL EXPECTATIONS AND VISUAL IMAGINATION
Dominic Gregory
The University of Sheffield
1. Introduction
Imagine seeming to see a box of matches on a table. Now imagine moving
slightly, while trying to keep the matchbox in view. You would be startled if
the box of matches were suddenly to stop looking to you like a box, instead
apparently morphing into a toy car. We thus tend to betray our implicit visual
expectations, by responding with sudden surprise to visual experiences that are
suitably discontinuous with their immediate predecessors.
The surprise illustrated there is different to the more considered surprise
that we often feel in other contexts. I would be taken aback if an ordinarily
reliable informant told me that an eight-year old child recently ran a marathon
in just over two hours. But the surprise that I would then feel is different to
the startlement illustrated in the previous paragraph. While the surprise in the
earlier case is doubtless shaped by one’s experiences of the world, it seems to
arise independently of the relatively sophisticated processes of learning that lead
us to our beliefs about, say, age-related marathon times.
Psychological work on vision has commonly written predictions and their
ensuing expectations into the workings of the visual system: ‘[m]any theories
of vision have been premised on the central role played by prediction’1. And
neurologists have tried to describe, at the neural level, the ways in which expec-
tations and predictions interact with earlier parts of the visual system, managing
very swiftly to shape its products.2 Philosophers have also noted the special sta-
tus of some expectations in relation to visual episodes, and they have tried to
understand the ways in which they shape visual experiences.3
The fundamental roles that expectations play in vision raise various
theoretical questions. What cognitive processes generate visual expectations?
Where do expectations of various sorts sit in the hierarchy of processes that
generate conscious visual experiences? And how are visual expectations realised
neurologically? Those questions are most naturally tackled by psychologists and
neuroscientists. But the status of appropriate expectations within vision also
raises issues with a more clearly philosophical cast.
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One might wonder, in particular, about the sorts of contents that visual
expectations involve, and about the types of mental representation that they
exploit. Now, expectations of different sorts may play distinct roles in vision. The
case sketched at the very start of this paper involved visual expectations whose
frustration is capable of leading straight to conscious surprise. But perhaps some
expectations interact almost immediately with the products of unconscious early
stages of visual processing, where the expectations themselves are buried deeply
enough that their frustration cannot impinge upon one’s consciousness.
From now on, then, let’s focus exclusively upon those implicit expectations
about visual appearances whose frustration is capable of yielding immediate
experiences of conscious surprise. (These sorts of expectations are particularly
amenable to philosophical theorizing, because they are frequently close to the
surface of consciousness: we can often easily recover our implicit expectations
about what things will look like from new viewpoints, for instance.) The current
paper will investigate the contents of certain such visual expectations, and the
forms of mental representation that they involve.
Here is a more detailed description of what follows. Section 2 identifies a
couple of significant strands within philosophical discussions of an important
variety of visual expectations: the first of them relates to the nature of the
expectations’ contents, while the second relates to the nature of the underlying
mental representations that they feature. Sections 3 and 4 criticise the resulting
picture of the nature of the relevant visual expectations, and they identify some
constraints that ought to be satisfied by a better account.
Section 5 expounds some general ideas about the nature of the contents that
may belong to visual mental images and other forms of representation, like many
pictures, that capture what things look like. Section 6 then uses those ideas to
articulate a new and better approach to the nature of the contents belonging
to the variety of visual expectations initially discussed in section 2. Section 7
extends the resulting position, by relating another variety of visual expectations
to another aspect of visual experience, while section 8 considers some objections.
Section 9 concludes.
2. Two Trends
Our visual experiences of objects as located in external space, and as having
definite three-dimensional shapes, are closely linked to our implicit expectations
about what things will look like from alternative viewpoints. Someone who sees
an item as being cube-shaped, for instance, will implicitly expect the thing’s
visual appearance to differ in certain regular ways from different places. If those
expectations are frustrated, immediate surprise will usually result.
Numerous philosophers have noted these connections, sometimes making
pretty strong claims for their importance to visual experience. Husserl, for in-
stance, held ‘that a given perception would not be phenomenologically of a
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material object in a spatial scene at all if it did not sustain the possibility in
principle of changing your viewpoint and coming to perceive [other nonvisible
portions of the same thing and indeed] objects in neighbouring regions—a pos-
sibility which we appreciate as motivated by perceptual consciousness itself.’4
And Siegel notes that ‘if one is looking at a flowerpot, [ . . . ] [o]ne expects [‘one’s
visual phenomenology’] to change in specific ways. For instance, one typically
expects specific other parts of the flowerpot to come into view, and one expects
these unseen parts to be continuous in various respects with the seen parts and
discontinuous in others’5.
Return to the example outlined at the start, involving an apparent visual
encounter with a box of matches. The surprise that you would manifest, if the
apparent box were to assume the visual appearance of a toy car in the wake of
your having moved slightly, arises from the frustration of certain implicit expec-
tations that you possess, expectations which somehow relate to what things look
like from novel viewpoints. Or, as we can say, the surprise that you would manifest
arises from the frustration of certain viewpoint-relative visual expectations.
Husserl and Siegel agree in holding that those expectations take a certain
form: the expectations relate to the visual experiences that you foresee having,
upon changing your position. Your surprise would thus supposedly flow from a
mismatch between the kind of visual experience that you ended up having and
the type of visual experience that you expected to have. You were landed with
a visual experience in which things looked like this to you, but you expected to
have one in which things looked like that.
What sorts of mental representations underlie those expectations? Suppose
that, upon apparently seeing a matchbox and then moving slightly, you were
asked what you had expected the box to look like once you had moved. It is
likely that some mental visual imagery, or a picture, would be helpful for you at
that point. For while, as noted above, implicit expectations of the relevant sort are
often pretty close to consciousness, expressing their contents just using language
is challenging. Your expectations would not merely have related to aspects of the
apparently seen item’s shape, but also to, say, aspects of its colouration, texture,
and the play of light across its surfaces, things that generally take a lot of effort
to put into words very well.
Yet these are difficulties of a familiar sort: they arise whenever one tries to
capture verbally what it is like for things to look a certain way. Additional aspects
of our viewpoint-relative visual expectations also suggest that they characterise
foreseen states of affairs in a manner that is closely bound to vision.
The expectations are perspectival, for instance: they concern what things
look like from appropriate viewpoints within the apparently encountered scene.
Consider the surprise that you would feel if, upon apparently seeing a car from
the side and then moving very slightly, you ended up apparently having a bird’s-
eye view of the vehicle. There are viewpoints from which you would expect to
have a bird’s-eye view of the car. It is just that, while you expected things to look
like this from over there, you did not expect them to look like this from here.
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Dummett concurs that ‘seeing an object as this or that shape or nature’
‘[p]lainly . . . has much to do with the expectations generated by the perception’.
He makes a suggestion about the form of representation that the expectations
(whose contents he identifies with ‘proto-thoughts’) employ. After remarking
that ‘we are in fact here operating at a level below that of thought expressible in
words’, he proposes that ‘the vehicle of such thoughts . . . should be said . . .
to consist in visual imagination superimposed on the visually perceived
scene’.6
In a somewhat similar vein, Strawson claims that ‘[n]on-actual perceptions
are in a sense represented in, alive in, the present perception [of apparently
‘enduring and distinct’ objects]; just as they are represented, by images, in the
image-producing activity of the imagination’. He then asks whether we ‘[m]ay . . .
not find a kinship between the capacity for this latter kind of exercise of the
imagination and the capacity which is exercised in actual perception of [the
previously mentioned kind]’.7
Dummett’s proposal provides a rousingly affirmative answer to Strawson’s
question. It fits, too, with the various observations about viewpoint-relative visual
expectations made over the previous few paragraphs. For mental visual images
do indeed represent scenes in a manner that is especially bound to vision; a
manner that is perspectival in the same sort of way that vision itself is, for
instance. If we assume that viewpoint-relative visual expectations call upon our
powers of mental visual imagery, then, it looks as though we may account for
the apparently visual nature of their characterisations of expected scenarios.8
Here, then, are two lines of thought that some philosophers have had about
certain visual expectations. They have claimed, first, that viewpoint-relative vi-
sual expectations pertain to the character of the visual experiences that we will
enjoy under appropriate conditions. And it has been suggested, second, that the
expectations deploy mental visual imagery.
While those proposals are evidently separate, they combine to paint an
overall picture of viewpoint-relative visual expectations that is quite attractive.
For the expectations surely do relate to what apparently seen items will look
like. But isn’t that precisely the gist of the view that viewpoint-relative visual
expectations concern the nature of the visual experiences that we will have under
suitable circumstances? Moreover, mental visual imagery supplies us with the
most obvious example of a form of mental representation which presents things
to us in a manner that apes vision, by capturing what things look like. So doesn’t
it make evident sense to assume that viewpoint-relative visual expectations deploy
mental visual imagery?
3. Surprises
We have seen how, when things look just ‘wrong’ to us in the wake of
changes in our visual perspectives on them, we respond with surprise. These
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responses signal the prior presence of implicit expectations, ones relating to what
apparently viewed things look like from novel viewpoints.
The previous section presented a more detailed account of the nature of
those viewpoint-relative expectations: it is claimed that the expectations relate to
what things would look like to us if we were to adopt the relevant viewpoints.
That account then generates an explanation of why we respond with surprise,
in cases like the ‘matchbox’ one discussed above. According to the relevant
explanation, we are surprised by the discrepancy between, on the one hand,
the nature of the visual experiences that we are having, in the wake of having
moved, and, on the other, the nature of the visual experiences that we expected to
have.
That account of the mechanisms which lead to suitable responses of sur-
prise puts the relevant responses at some distance from more ordinary examples.
Imagine that you are about to step through an open door, into what looks like a
sunny afternoon. You pass through the door, only to find yourself being lashed
by howling winds and soaked by buckets of rain, under a dark and stormy sky.
You would be surprised. Why so?
Well, you expected things to be one way outside—sunny—but you found
them to be another—very much not sunny. Your surprise, that is, registered
a discrepancy between what you expected things to be like and what things
apparently turned out to be like. You might reflect, in addition, that you had not
expected to have a visual experience as of an encounter with a windy and rainy
afternoon; and that the visual experience that you are having in the wake of your
passage through the door is hence at odds with the visual experience that you
had expected to enjoy. But your recognition of that reflexive discrepancy would
hardly be the norm.
Our surprise at what we see is, more generally, ordinarily a product of our
registration of a clash between what we expect to be the case and what our eyes
seemingly tell us to be the case. Standard examples of visual surprises are, in this
way, continuous with other typical examples of surprise.
Consider, for instance, a mathematician who, in the course of reasoning her
or his way through some thorny problem, is surprised by a certain conclusion
p. The mathematician’s surprise would not normally result from the recognition
of a clash between the realisation ‘I have concluded that p’ and an expecta-
tion of the form ‘I will not conclude that p’. Rather, it would arise from the
registration of a clash between p, as now seems to him or her to be the case,
and the expectation that not-p. Our responses of surprise are not, in general,
self-regarding.
The previous section’s characterisation of the contents of viewpoint-relative
expectations thus generates an oddly complicated description of the processes
that lead us, in the first place, to acknowledge the presence of those expectations.
For, if it is claimed that the expectations concern the nature of potential future
visual experiences, we are forced to locate the sources of the relevant visual
surprises in our reflexive awareness of what things are visually like for us once
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we have changed our positions, rather than simply in the apparent nature of what
we encounter through our eyes.
Is it possible, then, to construct an alternative account of the contents of
viewpoint-relative visual expectations, one that yields a more straightforward
and nonreflexive description of the sources of appropriate surprises, yet which
equally smoothly accommodates the fact that viewpoint-relative expectations
concern what things look like from novel perspectives?
I will return to that question below. First, though, it will be worth examining
at more length the other component of the view developed in the previous sec-
tion, according to which viewpoint-relative visual expectations somehow deploy
mental visual imagery.
4. Mental Images
The suggestion that viewpoint-relative visual expectations exploit our ability
to produce mental visual imagery looks, in some ways, to be a promising one.
For it respects nicely the fit between the visual nature of mental visual imagery
and the seemingly visual nature of viewpoint-relative visual expectations. But it
faces an obvious worry.
We seem constantly to be seeing objects that are located in external space.
And, when we are seeming to see external things, appropriately odd patterns
of visual experience that follow on from shifts in our position would make us
surprised. Our visual experiences are thus incessantly accompanied by viewpoint-
relative visual expectations.
But suppose that one’s possession of viewpoint-relative visual expectations
involves the exercise of one’s capacity to produce mental visual imagery. Then
our visual experiences must constantly be combined with exercises of that
capacity. Yet we just are not conscious of producing this volume of imagery.
While it is often easy enough to bring viewpoint-relative visual expectations
to consciousness using mental visual imagery, the expectations are generally
implicit, and such uses of mental visual imagery are the exception, not the
rule.
One’s lack of awareness of having produced enough mental visual imagery in
these circumstances is a problem, though, only if it is presumed that the mental
visual imagery that underlies viewpoint-relative visual expectations is conscious.
If we instead suppose, following the likes of Nanay and Phillips9, that mental
visual imagery can be unconscious, the difficulties may seem immediately to
disappear.
But that is a bit quick. When philosophers, psychologists, and others
write about mental visual imagery, they commonly provide a brief initial in-
dication of what they are talking about. Mental visual imagery is said to
be present when there is ‘seeing with the mind’s eye’, for instance, or when
one performs certain sorts of mental tasks in suitable ways—using one’s
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visual memories of what frogs like to assess whether or not frogs have tails,
say.
Those sorts of introductory sketches revolve around one’s introspective ap-
preciation of conscious experiences. The fact that the sketches proceed in this
way does not mean that it is being assumed that mental visual imagery is essen-
tially conscious. Yet the idea that a type of introspectively identifiable mental
states has unconscious tokens is sometimes puzzling. The claim that some-
one has unconscious pains is odd in a way that the claim that someone has
unconscious desires is not, for instance. For the view that pains are simply
suitable conscious experiences is quite attractive.10 And the idea that there are
unconscious mental visual images surely falls on the ‘perplexing’ side of the
fence.11
Summon a mental visual image of a chair, for instance. Suppose that you
are then asked to consider a mental episode which is like that one—and which
also involves, in particular, mental visual imagery—except that it is unconscious.
Just what are you being asked to do?
Are you being asked to consider, say, an unconscious mental episode that
features a mental representation of a chair, and which uses broadly the same
sorts of neurological resources that your conscious visualisation employed? If
so, though, why does that episode deserve to be described as featuring ‘mental
visual imagery’? For what does it have to do with ‘seeing in the mind’s eye’, as
we would ordinarily understand it? It does not seem, after all, that our everyday
concept of mental visual imagery insists on any particular neurological account
of the phenomenon.
The view that viewpoint-relative visual expectations deploy mental visual
imagery is therefore somewhat perplexing, because of its need to call upon un-
conscious mental visual imagery. Maybe we will need eventually to accept that
mental visual images need not be conscious. But it would be good to know
whether there are any alternative options, before we just wave unconscious men-
tal visual images through. The next section will, accordingly, lay the groundwork
for a different treatment of viewpoint-relative visual expectations, a treatment
that will avoid the problematic aspects of the ideas examined in this section and
the previous one.
5. Viewpoints and Distinctively Visual Contents12
Viewpoint-relative visual expectations characterise what things will look
like from appropriate visual perspectives. That point may seem straightaway to
force upon us the view that the expectations relate to the visual experiences that
we ourselves will have under suitable circumstances. If the expectations work like
that, though, the explanation provided in section 3 of why we feel surprise when
our implicit viewpoint-relative visual expectations are frustrated—in terms of
our reflexive awareness of divergences between what things are actually like for
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us visually and the sorts of visual experiences that we anticipated having—looks
inevitable.
But does the claim that an expectation concerns what things will look like
from a certain viewpoint really require that the expectation’s content relates to
some potential visual experiences?
Some considerations suggest otherwise. We are, in the ordinary run of things,
happy to allow that there are representations which show what things look like
from suitable viewpoints, even though the viewpoints are unoccupied by any
sensing subjects. These days, there are vehicles trundling around Mars that have
sent home dozens of photographs that capture what things recently looked like
from Martian visual perspectives, viewpoints that nobody then occupied and
which may never have been, and maybe never will be, occupied. Just intuitively,
the fact that the relevant photographs capture what things look like from the
relevant viewpoints has nothing to do with the subjective character of anyone’s
visual experiences; it merely reflects the photos’ accuracy.
So, consider the way that things look to you right now. Let’s assume that
your current visual experiences are accurate. Then the way that things look to
you right now really is a way that things look from the viewpoint that you occupy,
because the visual appearances that you are enjoying are accurate. You might
not have occupied that viewpoint, though; you could have ended up elsewhere.
Yet maybe things would nonetheless still have looked, from the viewpoint that
you occupy, just as they actually do.
Things look to you to be thus, say, and things are indeed thus relative to that
viewpoint. But the fact that things are thus relative to the viewpoint does not,
we may assume, essentially depend upon your presence there, or anyone else’s.
Hence things might have looked from that viewpoint the way that they actually
look, even if nobody were to have occupied it.
The way that things look from a particular viewpoint does not, in general,
derive from facts about the potential visual experiences that would be enjoyed by
a sensing subject placed in that position. Rather, it derives from what things are
like relative to the viewpoint. More fully, consider some way for things to look
W. Suppose that W involves a range of visual appearances, in that things will
look to be certain ways to anyone who has a visual experience of type W. Then
W is a way that things look from a certain viewpoint just in case those visual
appearances are accurate relative to the viewpoint.13
Produce a mental visual image of a chair, for instance. The way that your
mental visual image shows things as looking probably is not a way that things
look from the very visual perspective that you now occupy. But there may be,
somewhere, a viewpoint from which things do look that way. For the way that
your mental visual image shows things as looking involves a certain range of
visual appearances: things will look to be thus to anyone to whom things look
that way. And there may well be, somewhere, a viewpoint relative to which things
are thus—and so relative to which, among other things, a chair of the kind shown
in your mental visual image is suitably positioned.
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Given all that, however, we may allow that some mental state represents
things as looking a certain way from a viewpoint, without concluding that its
content makes reference to any potential visual experiences. For the representa-
tion’s content may simply identify the relevant way for things to look as being
such that its accompanying visual appearances are accurate relative to the visual
perspective concerned. But, if the representation does do that, it is just purporting
to inform us about what the world is like around the relevant viewpoint.
These theoretical possibilities are not exotic. We commonly take pictures and
mental visual images to present us with scenes, ones that the images characterise
in terms of what they look like, without assuming that the images are representing
the relevant situations as objects of sight. When we do this, we are understanding
the pictures and mental visual images as showing things as looking certain ways
from viewpoints, in the manner just described.
But when the representations are taken in that way, they do not themselves
represent any actual or potential visual experiences; they simply characterise
what the world is like relative to some visual perspective. Yet their contents are
nonetheless bound to vision in a special manner. For the scenes that they thereby
represent are delineated in distinctively visual terms, just as the world as we see
it in visual experience is presented to us in a distinctively visual medium: in both
cases, the lineaments of the scenes that we encounter are specified through the
medium of associated visual appearances.
Suppose that we handle viewpoint-relative visual expectations using the ideas
just presented. Will that enable us to provide a more satisfactory description
of the mechanisms whereby our implicit expectations sometimes interact with
visual experiences, to yield immediate responses of conscious surprise? And will
it enable us to avoid appeals to unconscious mental visual imagery in relation to
viewpoint-relative visual expectations?
6. Viewpoint-Relative Expectations
Imagine seeming to see an apple. Now imagine moving slightly, with the
result that the apple looks to you to have been transformed into a Christmas
pudding—which, of course, leads you to be surprised. What story do the ideas
presented in the previous section allow us to tell about the way in which your
implicit visual expectations in that case combine with your visual experiences, to
generate your startled response?
The account’s starting-point will be the claim that the implicit viewpoint-
relative visual expectations related to what things would look like from alternative
viewpoints, in the sense explained in the previous section.14 The account will
assume, that is, that the expectations’ contents simply identified certain ways for
things to look as being ways that things would look from appropriate alternative
viewpoints, in that the visual appearances which accompany those ways for
things to look would ostensibly be accurate relative to the viewpoints. The
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implicit expectations, on this approach, thus lack the objectionable reflexivity
that afflicted the competing account considered earlier.15
According to the view being developed, you implicitly expected things to
look a certain way—let’s describe it as an apple-y one, for convenience—from
the visual perspective v that you came to occupy upon moving. Yet, when you
moved, the way that things looked to you was not the apple-y one that featured
in your implicit expectation; rather, it was a pudding-y one instead. But how
did the pudding-y way that things looked to you when you moved combine with
your initial implicit expectation that things would look an apple-y way from v,
to yield a surprised response?
There is no great mystery there. The pudding-y visual experience that you
had, when you came to occupy the viewpoint v, involved its seeming to you that
things were a certain way: thus, let’s say. But you had implicitly expected things to
look an apple-y way from v. That apple-y way for things to look involved certain
visual appearances—things being like that, as we can put it—whose accuracy,
relative to a given perspective, is incompatible with things being thus relative to
it. Given that you kept track of v, so that you realise that you are now occupying
that viewpoint, you are confronted by the apparent fact that things are thus there,
although you had implicitly expected things there to be like that! No wonder you
are surprised.
That explanation of your surprise has just the form that we want. The pro-
cess that it describes is continuous with normal surprises elsewhere. In particular,
it does not represent your surprise as resulting from the reflexive registration of
discrepancies between the subjective character of your eventual visual experience
and the subjective character of the visual experiences that you anticipated having
upon moving. It instead characterises the surprise as resulting from the registra-
tion of a discrepancy between what you expected the world to be like around v
and what the world around v in fact looked to you to be like.
More generally, if we identify implicit viewpoint-relative visual expectations
with expectations concerning what things will look like from perspectives, we
can account in an appealingly natural way for the responses of surprise that the
expectations generate when they collide with suitably aberrant visual experiences.
But how does the suggested approach to viewpoint-relative visual expectations
bear upon the other aspect of the ideas presented in section 2, the view that the
expectations somehow exploit mental visual imagery?
That view nicely captured the distinctively visual nature of viewpoint-relative
expectations. But we can do that just as easily merely by assuming that the
expectations concern what things will look like from alternative perspectives;
that is, just by ascribing to them suitably distinctively visual contents. And there
is no obvious reason for denying the possibility of unconscious mental states that
possess contents of that kind, just as there is no evident reason for denying the
possibility of unconscious mental states that possess, say, mathematical contents.
The mere assumption that the contents of implicit viewpoint-relative expectations
concern what things will look like from novel perspectives thus provides us
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with the benefits that seemed to flow from the more problematic assumption of
unconscious mental visual imagery.
Indeed, it is not clear what point invoking unconscious mental visual im-
agery, in relation to viewpoint-relative visual expectations, would have, beyond
being a way of ensuring that the expectations have distinctively visual contents
of the type previously identified. Or, to put the basic point using less theoretical
baggage, it is unclear what would be achieved, in assuming that viewpoint-relative
visual expectations call upon our powers of mental visual imagery, that could
not more straightforwardly be gained merely by supposing that the contents of
the expectations are of a piece with the contents of mental visual images. In
particular, the latter assumption caters for the especially visual nature of the
expectations, while also straightforwardly allowing for them to be unconscious.
It might be claimed, in response, that any mental state that shows things as
looking a certain way thereby amounts to a mental visual image. If that is right,
the gap between the thought that viewpoint-relative visual expectations possess
the sorts of contents just suggested and the claim that they deploy mental visual
imagery disappears.
Well, perhaps that last suggestion, about the fundamental nature of mental
visual imagery, is correct. Or perhaps it isn’t: it is not evidently true that the
notion of a mental visual image is exhausted by the idea of a mental state that
possesses a certain sort of content.16 But there are, anyway, clear advantages to
cutting out the middleman, in spelling out what is distinctive about viewpoint-
relative visual expectations, by articulating their special nature just in terms of
the distinctively visual nature of their contents. For, in doing that, we are focusing
upon what really matters, rather than trying to ensure that the expectations get
assigned contents of the right type by invoking an unproven constitutive thesis.
7. Extending the Approach
Consider an ordinary case of partial occlusion within vision: imagine seeing
one book placed on top of another, from a nearby position that is slightly
above the top book. You cannot actually see the lower book’s top face, but
your experience incorporates an awareness of it, so it presumably features a
representation of it; you are aware of the top face as occluded, after all. More
generally, it seems that our visual experiences of partially occluded items—and
note that most of our visual experiences feature partial occlusion—somehow
incorporate representations of the occluded parts of the relevant things.
If that is right, though, ‘[h]ow do we represent the occluded parts of objects
we are looking at’17? Reconsider the envisaged example of one book placed on
top of another. Suppose that the uppermost book were to be removed, to reveal
that the lower ‘book’ in fact consists of a cunningly crafted empty box without
a cover, but rather with some form of platform on which the topmost book had
been placed. Then you would immediately be surprised, as some of your visual
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expectations would have been frustrated. Experiences of partial occlusion are
thus linked to the presence of appropriate visual expectations.
What sort of expectations are involved in this case? There does not seem
to be a satisfying way of answering that question simply by again invoking the
visual expectations discussed in previous sections, relating to what apparently
seen things will look like from novel perspectives within the viewed scene. For
it may be that, no matter which viewpoint within the scene you consider, the
currently hidden parts of apparently viewed items will be hidden from that
perspective too.
It might therefore be suggested that experiences of partial occlusion reflect
the presence of expectations pertaining to what our visual experiences would be
like, if the occluding item were absent. But that proposal once again imports
an unwelcome element of reflexivity: it generates a self-regarding account of
the surprise that we would feel in the case sketched a few paragraphs back, for
instance.
A better approach is now available. The expectations which bear most closely
upon partial occlusion seem indeed to be ones concerning what things would look
like under certain conditions, but not ones concerning what things would look
like to us. Rather, they are ones relating to what things would look like from the
viewpoint which we then occupy, if the occluding item were absent. The relevant
expectations, that is, identify certain ways for things to look as being such that
their associated visual appearances would be accurate relative to the perspectives
which we occupy, if the occluding item were gone.
While these expectations are not just the same as the ones discussed pre-
viously, because of their counterfactual component, they are again perspec-
tival, and they are ones whose contents—as relating directly to what things
look like—are of a piece with those belonging to the visual expectations dis-
cussed earlier. In particular, their contents are distinctively visual, yet they relate
merely to what the apparently seen item would itself be like, under appropriate
circumstances.
Nanay suggests that ‘the occluded parts of perceived objects’ are ‘repre-
sented by means of mental imagery’.18 As noted previously, our visual experi-
ences constantly feature items that we experience as being partially occluded. If
partially occluded items were to be represented by means of mental imagery, it
would follow—as before—that most of our visual experiences are accompanied
by large amounts of unconscious mental visual imagery. And this commitment
is, again, somewhat troubling.
The alternative view of partial occlusion sketched in the previous paragraphs
indicates an alternative option. There are no evident reasons for denying the
possibility of unconscious expectations concerning what things would look like
under appropriate conditions, just as there are no evident reasons for denying,
in general, the possibility of unconscious expectations relating to counterfactual
scenarios. We may therefore perhaps get the advantages that Nanay claims for
his appeal to unconscious mental visual imagery, in relation to visual experiences
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of partial occlusion, by appealing instead to unconscious mental states whose
contents are distinctively visual.19
The example considered in the current section, plus the approach to
viewpoint-relative visual expectations developed earlier, suggest a more general
moral. There are various aspects of visual experience that are intimately con-
nected to expectations of suitable sorts, as revealed by our immediate responses
of surprise under certain circumstances: we thus appear to have visual expecta-
tions relating to what things will look like from alternative perspectives, to what
things would look like if occluding items were to be absent, and—to consider a
new example—to what things will look like from our current perspectives, if the
positions of apparently seen items change.
It is tempting, in each of these cases, to seek to capture the essentially
visual character of the relevant expectations, along with their implicit nature, by
assuming that the expectations relate to what things will or would look like to us
under suitable conditions, and by assuming that they somehow call upon mental
visual imagery.
Those assumptions are not needed, however. We can respect the essentially
visual and implicit nature of the relevant expectations without directly citing
mental visual images: we need instead merely to suppose that the contents of the
expectations are like the contents of mental visual images. And the fact that the
expectations pertain to what things will, or would, look like does not force us
to accept that the expectations make reference to the sorts of visual experiences
that we ourselves will, or would, enjoy under appropriate conditions. For we may
instead ascribe to them contents relating merely to what things will, or would,
look like from certain perspectives, under appropriate circumstances.20
8. Some Objections
The previous sections have developed an account of the contents of certain
sorts of visual expectations. It might be objected, though, that the contents of the
relevant expectations are too indeterminate to support the suggested treatment.
Imagine seeing a book. You have various expectations concerning ‘what the
book will look like’ from alternative perspectives. Those expectations supposedly
identify ways for things to look as accurately capturing what things are like
relative to the relevant alternative viewpoints. But you need not have any very
detailed sense of just what the book will look like from some alternative place;
you may only have a very rough sense of how its visual appearance will be
transformed by perspectival shifts. Can the earlier approach cater for that point?
It can. Ways for thing to look—types of visual experiences—may be more
or less determinate. More specifically, they may permit more or less variation
in the subjective character of their instances. There are, at one extreme, types
that permit relatively little variation, like the type which encompasses all and
only those possible visual experiences that are subjectively indiscernible from,
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say, your own current visual experience. But there are, at the other extreme, types
that allow for lots of variation: consider, for instance, the type that encompasses
just those possible visual experiences that feature something having a certain
broad outline within a certain region of the visual field.
Ways for things to look of the latter sort associated with relatively bare
collections of visual appearances, ones that do relatively little to fix just what the
world must be like for things to look the relevant ways from perspectives. But
plenty of representations of what things look like from viewpoints involve ways
for things to look that are permissive in this way. The ways that black and white
photographs and monochromatic etchings show things as looking do not settle
the precise colours of the items featuring in the scenes that the representations
display, for example; and the ways that mental visual images show things as
looking are also often highly indeterminate, in that they leave untouched many
matters relating to the items which they posit.
The earlier elaboration of the claim that the contents of visual expectations
characterise things as looking certain ways from visual perspectives thus does
not force an unreasonable level of determinacy upon their contents. For the
account’s appeal to types of visual experiences, and their associated bodies of
visual appearances, provides it with a appealing level of flexibility.
Another potential worry relates to the explanation provided above, of how
viewpoint-relative visual expectations may generate responses of surprise. That
explanation had the following rough shape. Suppose that you seem to see an
external item. You have implicit expectations relating to what the item will look
like from alternative perspectives. Assume that, upon moving to one of those
perspectives, the visual appearances that you thereby enjoy clash with your im-
plicit expectations. Then you will be surprised. There is an important gap in that
explanation, however.
There are many possible ways ‘to characterise things as looking some way’
from a certain viewpoint. For there are many possible ways to single out types
of visual experiences. I can pick out the type of visual experiences in which
things look just like this to someone, for example, thereby making reference to
what things are like visually for me right now. But I can also pick out types of
visual experiences in more roundabout ways: I can single out the type of visual
experiences in which things look to someone just how they looked to Isaac
Newton at a certain moment m during 1662, say, even though I have no idea
what things looked like to Newton at the relevant time.
There are thus many modes of presentation by means of which we can
identify ways for things to look. What modes of presentation are relevant to
viewpoint-relative visual expectations? This is a pressing question, because many
of the modes of presentation by means of which we can identify ways for things to
look will wreak havoc upon the proposed explanatory model of how viewpoint-
relative visual expectations are able to produce responses of surprise.
Suppose again, for instance, that you seem to see an apple, but that the
apple seems to mutate into a Christmas pudding when you move slightly,
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which makes you surprised. And assume that your implicit visual expecta-
tions merely characterised the way that things looked to Newton at moment m
as being the way that things would look from the viewpoint that you came to
occupy.
Given that you had no information about what things looked like to New-
ton at moment m, how is your visual expectation meant to have engaged with
your ensuing visual experience, to prompt a surprised response? Your lack of
information about what things looked like to Newton means that you have no
way of detecting any clash between the visual appearances that you have come to
enjoy, upon moving, and the way that the visual expectation characterised things
as looking.
The earlier account of the contents of visual expectations therefore needs
to be supplemented, by a specification of the manner in which ways for things
to look are identified within those contents. More specifically, the explanatory
burdens of the account require that the expectations should somehow carry with
them information about what it is like for things to look the relevant ways. For,
otherwise, we will not be able to detect those cases in which the ways that things
look to us, upon moving, clash with the ways that we previously expected things
to look.
But this is not a big problem. Although many modes of presentation that
identify types of visual experiences do not speak to what it is like for things to
look those ways, others do. In particular, it is possible to identify appropriate
ways for things to look merely in terms of what it is like for things to look
those ways; that is, in terms of whatever subjective character is shared by their
instances. Produce a mental visual image of a chair, for instance. Now consider
a visual experience in which things look the way that the image shows things as
looking. Why does the visual experience that you are considering count as one
in which things look the relevant way?
The answer is simple: it is because the visual experience has a suitable
subjective character. Conversely, though, any visual experience that shares that
subjective character will also count as one in which things look the way that your
visual mental image shows things as looking. Hence all that there is to being a
visual experience of that type is the possession of an appropriate subjective
character. As you might put it, in the light of your consciousness of your mental
visual image of a chair, to be a visual experience in which things look the way
that the image shows things as looking is merely to be one in which things look
like that.
The explanatory ambitions of the earlier account of the contents of
viewpoint-relative visual expectations, and of visual expectations of other ap-
propriate sorts, mean that it does need to be embellished with an account of the
modes of the presentation by means of which the expectations identify ways for
things to look. In particular, those modes of presentation must be restricted to
ones in which ways for things to look are identified in terms of what it is like for
things to look the relevant ways. But once the account is supplemented in that
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manner, its explanatory model of the geneses of our surprised responses, when
patterns of visual experiences take a turn for the unexpected, proceeds as hoped.
It is worth noting, too, that the proposed restriction on the modes of pre-
sentation that feature in suitable visual expectations looks set to have striking
empirical consequences.
Consider some implicit viewpoint-relative expectation, to the effect that
things will look a certain way from an alternative viewpoint. According to what
has gone before, that expectation is a mental representation whose content sin-
gles out a way for things to look in terms of what it is like for things to look that
way. But, given what we know about visual consciousness and its relationship
to neurology, it seems like that the relevant representation will be realised, at
least in part, using activity in properly visual neural areas, just as mental visual
imagery seems to involve the recycling of visual neural resources.21 The current
account of the contents of suitable visual expectations hence suggests that prop-
erly visual neural resources will play their part in the realisation of the sorts of
visual expectations being discussed in this paper.
9. Conclusion
The previous sections have examined some important varieties of implicit
visual expectations. It has been argued that the contents of the relevant expecta-
tions should be taken to relate to the ways that things will look from perspectives
rather than to us, as this provides a more satisfying account of the manner in
which the frustration of the expectations yields responses of surprise; in particu-
lar, it purges the account of unnecessary and implausible elements of reflexivity.
It has also been argued that the resulting ideas supply the benefits associated
with the supposition that the expectations deploy mental visual imagery, without
requiring us to posit unconscious mental visual imagery.
The previous discussion focused entirely upon vision. But appropriate sorts
of implicit expectations seem to be relevant to nonvisual forms of experience too.
Consider hearing. There is a difference between experiencing some sounds
as coming from externally located sources and experiencing some sounds as
not coming from external sources: compare, say, the experience of hearing
some music played over loudspeakers with the experience of hearing ringing
in your ears. These experiential differences correlate with different sorts of
implicit expectations, in a manner that is similar to what we find in visual
cases.
We expect the loudness of sounds that seem to be coming from externally
located sources to vary in regular ways, for example, depending upon the spatial
locations of auditory perspectives relative to the position of the sound’s apparent
source. But we do not have parallel expectations for what seem to be purely ‘inner’
sounds, like transient tinnitus. The frustration of these implicit expectations can
generate responses of surprise.
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But an analogue of the dialectic played out above, in relation to vision,
visual expectations, and mental visual imagery, can be rehearsed in relation to
hearing, auditory expectations, and mental auditory imagery. For, just as we
should distinguish between representations that show things as looking certain
ways from perspectives, and ones that show things as looking certain ways to us,
so we should distinguish between representations that present things as sounding
certain ways from perspectives, and ones that present things as sounding certain
ways to us.
The main elements of section 5’s account of the ‘from perspectives’ visual
cases can then be put to use in explaining just what it is for a representation’s
content to present things as sounding a certain way from an auditory perspective.
And, as before, the resulting ideas yield an approach to auditory expectations
that does away with undesirable and unnecessary elements of reflexivity, and
which also provides an improved alternative to potential appeals to unconscious
mental auditory imagery. Parallel remarks apply to other actual and possible
forms of sensory experience.
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Notes
1. Enns and Lleras (2008), p. 327.
2. See, for instance, Kok, Failing, and de Lange (2014); Seriès and Seitz (2013),
pp. 8 – 11; Summerfield and Egner (2009). More generally, the view that fairly
elementary mental processes frequently involve ‘predictions’, ‘expectations’, ‘an-
ticipations’ and similar phenomena is a popular one: see Bubic, von Cramon,
and Schubotz (2010) for a survey of areas in which such ideas have been
used.
3. See section 2 below.
4. Smith (2003), p. 77; see, for instance, Husserl (2001), p. 40. See Noë (2004), p. 77
for related remarks.
5. Siegel (2010), pp. 179–80. Siegel is neutral on the question whether these sorts
of relatively specific expectations feed into the accuracy-conditions of the ex-
periences with which they are associated (see (2010), pp. 196–7, in which she
discusses the potential effects of ‘bizarre expectations about what sort of phe-
nomenal character my visual experience will have if I peer around the other side
of the flowerpot’), although she holds that the contents of certain related, but
less specific, expectations are indeed included in the accuracy-conditions of visual
experiences of external objects: see Gregory (2015) for critical discussion.
6. Dummett (1993), pp. 121–2.
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7. Strawson ([1971] 1974), p. 59. Just prior to asking that question, though,
Strawson says that ‘[t]o see [a certain item] as a dog, silent and stationary, is
to see it as a possible mover and barker, even though you give yourself no
actual images of it as moving and barking’; so he would probably have denied
that viewpoint-relative visual expectations rely upon conscious mental visual
imagery. The status, with regards to consciousness, of any mental visual imagery
that is involved in viewpoint-relative visual expectations will become relevant
below.)
8. Nanay invokes mental visual imagery in seeking to understand the forms of
representation that underlie our visual experiences of apparently seen items as
occluded; see Nanay (2010) and (2016), and see section 7 below for discussion.
9. See Nanay (2010) and Phillips (2014). Nanay’s appeal to unconscious mental
visual imagery is discussed below, in section 7; see fn. 20 below for brief discussion
of Phillips’s views.
10. Kripke famously relied upon this assumption in his revamping of Cartesian
arguments against physicalism about the mind: see Kripke (1981), lecture 3.
Some philosophers have argued that pains do not have to be conscious, however:
see, for instance, Lycan (1996) and Rosenthal (1991).
11. Phillips (2014), fn. 17 cites a range of authors who just assume that the notion
of mental visual imagery requires such imagery to be conscious.
12. This section draws upon ideas developed at more length, and in the context of
the treatment of a very wide variety of ‘distinctively sensory’ representations—
including mental sensory images, many pictures, and other nonmental forms of
representation bound to appropriate sensory modalities—in Gregory (2013).
13. What are ‘viewpoints’ or ‘visual perspectives’, though? At a first pass, we may
identify them with spatiotemporal locations which are bound to suitable orien-
tational components; but, more generally, they may be treated functionally, just
as those bundles of contextual features relative to which visual appearances may
be assessed for accuracy or inaccuracy. See chapter 2 of Gregory (2013) for more
on all this.
14. This is a slight simplification. In Gregory (2015), I argue that our future-directed
expectations about the ways that things will look from alternative perspectives
flow from our present-directed expectations about the ways that things look from
alternative perspectives at the very times at which we are apparently viewing the
relevant items.
15. This remark assumes that the contents of visual appearances are not inevitably
reflexive in a certain way. More specifically, it assumes that the content of a
given visual appearance does not itself always somehow make reference to the
subjective character of the occurrent visual experiences that are being enjoyed by
one who enjoys a visual appearance with that very content.
16. The following, related, thesis seems more intuitively appealing than the one for-
mulated in the text, for instance: that all it is for a mental state to involve mental
visual imagery is for it to be a conscious mental state that possesses an appropriate
content.
17. Nanay (2010), p. 240. I will simply assume, for the purposes of what follows, that
we do represent the occluded parts in some way; see Nanay (2010), pp. 246–8
for criticism of attempts to account for the relevant phenomena simply in terms
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of our potential visual access to occluded portions of apparently seen things,
rather than in terms of our possession of actual representations of them (see also
Thomas (2009), p. 155).
18. Nanay (2016), p. 130. Nanay (2010) appeals to mental visual imagery in relation
not just to the sorts of partial occlusion considered in the text, but also in
relation to the phenomena exemplified by the Kanisza triangle. Briscoe (2011)
argues that these sorts of cases are, in fact, fundamentally different; Briscoe’s
paper also contains very interesting discussion of partial occlusion.
19. Nanay (2010), pp. 249–51 cites a range of considerations in support of his appeal
to mental visual imagery. But none of the relevant phenomena involve a clear
demarcation between mental visual images, on the one hand, and, on the other,
any potential mental states that are not mental visual images yet whose contents
are of the same sort as those belonging to mental visual images. The relevant
considerations therefore do not seem to support an appeal to mental visual
images, in particular, rather than an appeal to mental states with appropriately
distinctively visual contents.
20. In section 2 of his (2014), Phillips summarises a body of evidence that suggests
that there is no clear correlation between conscious uses of mental visual imagery
and performance in the standard experimental tasks—such as the mental rotation
ones famously discussed in Shepard and Metzler (1971)—that researchers have
commonly employed in arguing for the psychological reality of mental visual
imagery. He suggests that we therefore take performance in the relevant tasks
to be driven by processes that feature unconscious mental visual imagery, which
he calls ‘representational’ imagery, to distinguish it from conscious ‘experiential’
imagery. Now, it is argued, in Gregory (2010) and (2013), that the sorts of experi-
mental data at issue here only directly support hypotheses about the distinctively
visual nature of the contents involved in the processes that generate performance
in the experiments, rather than hypotheses about the especially pictorial nature
of the neural format which the underlying representations employ. If that is cor-
rect, though, the apparent irrelevance of conscious mental visual imagery to the
experimental data can be accommodated without any need to posit unconscious
mental visual imagery; we may instead simply posit unconscious mental states
with distinctively visual contents.
21. Given that the contents of mental visual images also take the same distinctively
visual form, the point currently being made in relation to implicit expectations
in fact suggests an partial explanation of why mental visual imagery needs to
call upon visual neurological resources, in terms of the practical demands placed
upon mental representations whose contents single out ways for things in terms
of what it is like for things to look those ways. See Gregory (2010) and chapter
5 of my (2013) for more on all this.
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